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1 Introduction
An important implication of rational choice theory is that increasing the number of consump-
tion alternatives can only make a decision maker better off by enabling him to choose an
option that is ranked higher in his preference ordering. Much doubt has been cast on this
prediction since Iyengar and Lepper (2000), which reported experimental evidence suggest-
ing that it is significantly more likely for large menus of options to result in the consumer
choosing none of the market alternatives available to him because of the higher degree of
complexity that is associated with making an active choice in such menus. This has come to
be known as the choice overload or too-much-choice effect, and by now has reached the status of
being discussed in leading undergraduate microeconomics textbooks.1
Choice overload has been observed in experimental as well as real-market environments
over important economic decisions such as employee participation in pension savings plans
(Iyengar, Huberman, and Jiang, 2004; Iyengar and Kamenica, 2010; Kamenica, 2012). At least
partly in response to the large body of empirical work that has followed the original exper-
imental evidence on this phenomenon (Chernev et al, 2015 is a thorough survey), formal
recognition of the potentially harmful effects that large menus could have on consumer wel-
fare was recently made by regulatory authorities such as the UK Office for Gas and Electricity
Markets, which intervened and forced energy suppliers to ban complex tariffs and restrict the
number of products they could offer to no more than four (Ofgem, 2013, 2014).
In addition to such novel consumer welfare considerations and concerns, once it is ac-
knowledged that consumers can become choice-overloaded by large numbers of products,
important implications for firm competition also arise. In particular, rather than offering
menus with as many products as possible, firms that interact with such consumers have a
clear incentive to find a balance between offering menus with sufficiently many products in
order to appeal to as many consumers as they possibly can, and offering menus with suffi-
ciently few products in order not to overload consumers and lose them to their competitors
or drive them out of the market altogether. This strategic trade-off lies at the heart of the
novel model of duopolistic competition in menu design that we introduce and analyse in this
study.
Our model assumes that consumers are heterogeneous in their preferences as well as in
their overload characteristics, and that firms have complete information about how these
are distributed in the consumer population. For simplicity, and also to isolate the pure ef-
fect of overload on the market outcome, the firms’ pricing decisions are suppressed by as-
suming that each product comes with an exogenously given markup. Hence, to analyze
consumer welfare in this setting where consumer surplus is inapplicable, we introduce a
simple and novel welfare proxy, the market effectiveness index, which associates each market
state/strategy profile with the actual number of products that is available to consumers once
the effects of overload have been accounted for. As such, it is increasing in the number of
products that are offered by the two firms and decreasing in the number of consumers who
are overloaded at these menus.
1See Varian (2014, p. 589), for example.
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We first consider the benchmark special case of the model where no consumer is ever
overloaded. In this context, we show that the Hotelling-type maximum-variety/minimum-
differentiation symmetric profile where both firms offer all products in the market is always
an equilibrium. Moreover, although this is not the unique equilibrium when preferences are
uniformly distributed and markups differ, it does become one in strictly dominant strategies
when products are equi-profitable.
Retaining the assumption of uniformly distributed preferences and equal markups, we
then move on to the identification of necessary and sufficient conditions for minimum-variety/
minimum-differentiation equilibria to exist in which firms offer the same one product. We
also establish an equivalence between the existence of such equilibria and ones where firms
offer single but distinct products. We then demonstrate that full product differentiation equi-
libria with equally sized menus are impossible in this environment for higher numbers of
products whenever the consumers’ overload thresholds are either uniformly or geometri-
cally/exponentially distributed. We further show that full product differentiation is impossi-
ble under any overload distribution when markups are allowed to differ and the most prof-
itable product is sufficiently more profitable (not necessarily more than twice as much) rela-
tive to the second most profitable one. We conclude this section by focusing on the conditions
under which symmetric profiles with three or four products (corresponding to cases that ap-
pear to have particular real-world relevance) can be obtained as equilibria under the above
overload distributions. The testable empirical predictions of our model here include, for ex-
ample, that in order for these equilibria to be possible it must be that roughly half of all
consumers become overloaded in menus with more than six products.
We then move to the general version of our model where preferences are not assumed to
be distributed in a particular way. In this more general context we first provide a general
characterization of symmetric equilibria and show that whenever such equilibria exist, they
take an essentially unique form, in terms of both the number and structure of the products
that are offered by both firms. Finally, we raise and answer questions on the relation between
equilibrium and market effectiveness within the class of symmetric profiles in this more gen-
eral environment. In particular, we note that in many recent market models with boundedly
rational consumers, firms have a strategic incentive to obfuscate –e.g. to enhance product
variety by offering many substitute products; increase the dimensionality of fees; frame the
offered products in a certain way.2 In these models, greater complexity induces consumer
confusion and, as a result, increases the probability that the consumer makes the wrong de-
cision by choosing an inferior product, enabling firms to profit out of it (Spiegler, 2016). As
mentioned above, however, increasing the complexity of the offered menu in the market we
study has a negative effect on firms as well, because a choice-overloaded consumer that finds
a menu offered by a firm too complex either purchases from the rival firm or defers choice
altogether. Therefore, it is not obvious a priori whether, in our model, the market by itself
is able to achieve the optimal (from the market-effectiveness point of view) degree of “com-
plexity” or if a regulatory intervention is needed to correct the market failure. We investigate
2For example, Spiegler (2006) shows that in a market model populated by consumers with limited ability to understand complicated
products firms employ complex pricing structures. Chiovenau and Zhou (2013), on the other hand , study a price-frame competition model
and find that an increase in competition leads firms to increase frame complexity. A third example is given by Gabaix and Laibson (2006)
which shows that the presence of myopic consumers induces firms to shroud relevant product information in equilibrium.
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this issue by showing that under both uniformly and geometrically distributed overload,
the symmetric profiles that maximize our notion of market effectiveness can be obtained as
the free-market equilibrium outcomes only in the extreme cases where optimality is attained
when the commonly offered menu contains either a single product or all products that a firm
could possibly offer. Moreover, it turns out that in both the uniform and geometric cases the
equilibrium potential of the optimal symmetric profile is destroyed by firms’ profitable devi-
ations to smaller menus. Therefore, a novel policy implication of our analysis is that, in such
environments, interventions that are motivated by considerations such as those captured by
our market effectiveness welfare proxy might improve upon the market outcome by impos-
ing a lower rather than an upper bound on the number of products that firms can offer.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 lays out our duopolistic model and introduces
the proposed index of market effectiveness. Section 3 discusses the benchmark case of fully
rational consumers under various assumptions on preferences and markups. Sections 4 and
5 analyse the model under the assumption of uniformly distributed preferences and under
general preferences, respectively. Section 6 discusses the related literature and Section 7 con-
cludes. Appendix A provides additional details on the decision process that our consumers
are assumed to follow, much of which coincides with the model of overload-constrained util-
ity maximization that is introduced in Gerasimou (2018). Appendix B contains the proofs of
all results that appear in the main body of the paper, and also the statements and proofs of
some auxiliary results that may be of some independent interest. Finally, Appendix C pro-
vides four real-world contemporary market examples where firms compete in small menus
of sizes that contain between three and five products.
2 The Model
2.1 General Setup
We consider a market with two firms and let X := {x1, x2, . . . , xk} be a finite set of k ≥
3 products that can be sold by either of them. Although we do not impose this structure
explicitly, we think of each product xi as being multi-attribute (relevant attributes could be
the product’s brand name, price, quality, color etc.). As such, we implicitly assume that it is
cognitively costly for consumers to make comparisons between the various products. The set
M denotes the collection of all non-empty subsets of X. An element D ofM is a menu. Firms
are assumed to engage in simultaneous, one-shot competition in menu design, where each
firm’s pure strategy is a menu inM. Our analysis focuses on pure strategies only. A generic
strategy profile is denoted by (A, B), where A and B are the menus offered by the first and
second firm, respectively. While mixed-strategy equilibria are guaranteed to exist in the game
with finitely many strategies that is induced by our model, the existence of pure-strategy
equilibria is not immediate. We will show constructively, however, that such equilibria exist.
We abstract from the firms’ pricing decisions by associating each product xi with an ex-
ogenous markup wi > 0 that is common across firms. This assumption makes the analysis
tractable and allows us to focus on the pure effect that overloaded consumers have on the
3
equilibrium market outcomes. It also allows us to be agnostic on whether complexity or
prices are more important for consumers in those borderline cases that would have other-
wise arisen where the first menu is marginally less complex and, at the same time, features
marginally more expensive jointly offered products. We acknowledge, however, that our as-
sumption is restrictive and that an extension of our model in the direction of allowing for
pricing as well as menu-design decisions would indeed make it more realistic, particularly
after relevant empirical evidence becomes available that could provide some guidance in this
regard.
We assume that there is a unit mass of consumers who consider each product in X to be
desirable (hence choosable) and who are not currently endowed with a product from this
set. Consistent with these assumptions, we interpret their outside option as a non-market
alternative that does not belong to the set X but, from the point of view of one-period de-
cision making, can be considered objectively inferior to every product in X. However, our
consumers are also potentially overloaded in the sense that they face cognitive, time or other
types of constraints that may render them unable/unwilling to process menus that exceed a
certain complexity threshold. In such cases our consumers are assumed to avoid/indefinitely
defer choice by opting for their outside option. In line with the relevant empirical evidence
that was discussed in the introduction, we let the complexity of a menu coincide with its
cardinality.
More specifically, we assume that at every strategy profile (A, B), each consumer first pre-
scans each of these two menus sequentially to determine whether it is complex relative to his
idiosyncratic complexity threshold or not, and discards any menu(s) that exceed this thresh-
old. For each menu D ∈ {A, B} that he does not find complex, he inspects the products
contained in it and identifies his utility-maximizing option, denoted x∗(D).3 If he finds only
one menu D to be non-complex, the consumer purchases x∗(D). If he finds both menus A
and B to be non-complex, he compares the best two alternatives x∗(A) and x∗(B) and buys
his most preferred one. Finally, if he finds both menus to be complex, the consumer buys
nothing and opts for the deferral/outside option.
Let us elaborate with an example that emphasizes the sequential nature of the above de-
cision process, with the latter laid out formally in Appendix A. Consider a consumer who is
about to relocate and move to a brand new house that he has just bought. Before doing so
he must choose from one of the two providers that are available in his region (both of which
were previously unknown to him) which phone & broadband package to buy. Suppose the
consumer wants to spend no more than five minutes reviewing the products that are avail-
able on each provider’s website. Suppose also that he spends about a minute to read through
each product, and needs an additional minute to find his most preferred one. This translates
into a menu-cardinality threshold of four products. Suppose now that both providers offer
four-product menus. The consumer can be thought of as pre-scanning and then finding his
utility-maximizing option from the first provider in the morning, and doing the same with
respect to the second provider’s menu in the evening. Crucially, even though he is able to
process each menu separately, at no point is the consumer assumed to be simultaneously
3We assume that consumers’ preferences are strict, which implies that x∗(D) is always a singleton.
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faced with all products that are available in the market. Therefore, the decision process that
we have imposed is internally consistent.4
Consumers in our model are assumed to be heterogeneous in terms of their preferences
as well as their overload characteristics. To capture preference heterogeneity we assume that
the probability pA(xi) of some product xi being the consumer’s most preferred alternative in
menu A satisfies
0 < pA(xi) < 1. (1)
This assumption imposes a strong form of preference heterogeneity by requiring that there be
no menu where all consumers agree on which alternative is the best. In addition, we assume
that the choice probability of product xi when menus A and B are available is given by
pA∪B(xi) =
pX(xi)
∑
x∈A∪B
pX(x)
. (2)
Thus, in the absence of overload constraints, the choice process of the “average” consumer
in the population coincides with a special case of the well-known and widely applied model
due to Luce (1959).
We now turn to the specification of the consumers’ overload characteristics. As was out-
lined above, we assume that consumers have generally distinct overload menu-size thresh-
olds. To capture this heterogeneity, for any strictly positive integer h we let q(h) denote the
proportion of consumers who are not overloaded at menus with h or fewer elements. This
makes q a cumulative density function (cdf) which we will refer to as the overload cdf. The
support of q is a set {1, . . . , k + n}, where n is an integer that may be weakly positive or neg-
ative, and is restricted so that k + n ≥ 1. Given some menu A, we will often abuse notation
slightly by writing q(A) ≡ q(|A|). We assume that no consumer is overloaded in menus with
just one option, which translates into q(1) = 1. Moreover, since q is a cdf, it also holds that
q(A) = q(B) whenever |A| = |B| and q(A) ≤ q(B) whenever |A| > |B|. Given our assump-
tions on the support of q, the model encompasses all possible cases that lie between the one
extreme where no consumer is ever overloaded at any menu and the other extreme where all
consumers are overloaded at all menus with more than one option.
We note that the consumers’ preferences and cognitive characteristics/overload thresh-
olds will be treated as independent random variables in our model. This assumption is not
without loss of generality. However, one reason why it may be justified in our setting is the
general and unstructured nature of the products in the set X. Specifically, if the dimensional-
ity of the products’ attributes had been explicitly modelled, then correlations between the two
components of the model would also need to be allowed for. For example, of particular rel-
evance there would be the cases where lower overload thresholds are associated with higher
4We interpret the consumer’s complexity threshold at the individual menu level as having been generated by a forward-looking rea-
soning whereby the consumer correctly anticipates that he will eventually be called to pre-scan and possibly fully process two menus with
at least one option. This means, for example, that if both firms offer singleton menus, the consumer will be able to sequentially process
each item in those menus and make a choice between them even if his complexity threshold at the individual-menu level suggests that
he is overloaded whenever there are just two products. Under this interpretation, such a situation would have arisen if the consumer’s
complexity threshold in the sequential processing of menus was such that the consumer could not consider a total of three or more market
alternatives.
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degrees of preference for simple products that can be described in few attributes. However,
one of the primary objectives of our paper is to formalize the idea that choice overload is an
interesting and relevant phenomenon in the context of firm competition. Hence, as a starting
point of this analysis we have chosen to focus on the simpler case where a specific structure
on the products’ attributes is not imposed, and, as a result, no clear direction exists that a
correlation between preferences and cognitive characteristics should be assumed to take.
2.2 Payoffs
Given some menu D, we let ID := {i : xi ∈ D} denote the index set of the products in this
menu. When the first firm offers A and its opponent offers B we let its baseline payoff that
corresponds to the case where no consumer is overloaded at either of these menus be defined
by
R1(A, B) = ∑
i∈IA\B
pA∪B(xi)wi +
1
2 ∑j∈IA∩B
pA∪B(xj)wj. (3)
In words, each product xi that is offered only by the first firm is associated with an expected
payoff that is given by its markup, wi, multiplied by the probability of that product being
chosen conditional on menus A and B being available in the market. If xi is offered by both
firms, then the above expected payoff is multiplied by 12 to reflect the assumption that ties are
broken uniform-randomly. The second firm’s baseline payoff is defined symmetrically.5
We are now in position to introduce the actual payoff function which also accounts for the
possibility that some consumers are overloaded. Specifically, when overload is distributed
according to q, then the first firm’s payoff at profile (A, B) is given by
pi1(A, B) =

q(A) · R1(A, B), if |A| ≥ |B|
q(B) · R1(A, B) + [q(A)− q(B)] · ∑
i∈IA
pA(xi)wi, if |B| > |A|
(4)
Consider first the case where the menu A offered by the first firm is weakly more complex
than menu B. In this case, the fraction 1− q(A) of consumers who are overloaded at A will
discard this menu. At the same time, a fraction q(A) of them will consider A and identify its
best alternative x∗(A). These consumers will then compare x∗(A) with the best alternative
x∗(B) in B (which is weakly less complex than A) and buy their most preferred of the two,
5Our formulation assumes that markups are independent of how many firms are offering the relevant products. A more general approach
would have been to assume that markups decrease by some parameter α ∈ (0, 1] whenever both firms are offering those products. This
would change the definition of the baseline payoff function to R1(A, B) = ∑
i∈IA\B
pA∪B (xi)wi + α
1
2 ∑j∈IA∩B
pA∪B (xj)wj, and would convey the
basic intuition of the effects of increasing competition whereby a given product’s profitability is decreasing in the number of firms offering
it. Our current formulation here would be captured by the special case where α = 1. We have chosen not to pursue this more general
version of the model in this paper mainly because this parameter α would also need to be allowed to depend on the strategy profile (A, B),
and such context-dependence would in turn lead to a significant loss of tractability and discipline. We acknowledge, however, that such an
extension of our model would be desirable, especially if it is informed by relevant empirical work that motivates specific assumptions on
the values in the collection {αA,B : A, B ∈ M} of context-dependent competition-effect parameters.
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subject to the tie-breaking rule. Hence, firm 1 gets its baseline payoff R1(A, B) scaled down
by the fraction q(A) of consumers that are not overloaded at A.
Now suppose menu B is strictly more complex than A. As in the case above, only a fraction
q(A) of consumers will consider A. However, unlike the above case, firm 1 is now able to
attract a sub-fraction q(A)− q(B) ≥ 0 of consumers who are overloaded at B but not at A. For
these consumers the entire market consists of the products that are available in A. Hence, they
will buy their most preferred product x∗(A) offered by firm 1 regardless of what is offered by
firm 2. In addition, for these consumers the relevant choice probabilities of product xi in A is
pA(xi) and not pA∪B(xi). On the other hand, consumers who are not overloaded at either A or
B will consider both menus and hence will follow the procedure described above. Therefore,
the expected payoff that is derived from these consumers is simply q(B) · R1(A, B). Again,
the second firm’s payoff is defined symmetrically.
This payoff function captures the key tradeoff between variety and complexity that firms
are facing when consumers are potentially overloaded, which is the main motivating force
for the present study. Given that consumers’ preferences are heterogeneous, firms have an
incentive to include in the offered menu as many products as possible in order to maximise
the probability that the products contained in their menu are the consumers’ most preferred
ones. However, by increasing the size of the offered menu, firms also risk overloading con-
sumers and hence losing them to their rival or driving them out of the market altogether.
2.3 Market Effectiveness and Consumer Welfare
Since our model abstracts from firms’ pricing decisions, traditional welfare measures such
as consumer surplus are not applicable in our setting. A key aspect of our model, however,
is that some overloaded consumers may ultimately choose none of the products offered in
the market even though, by our product-desirability assumption, choosing something would
have been objectively better than choosing nothing. Moreover, even when overload does not
lead to choice deferral because only one of the two available menus is complex for a given
consumer, it still has an adverse effect on that consumer’s welfare by essentially narrowing
his market options. These facts motivate the need for some welfare measure that captures the
complexity-variety tradeoff that arises from the consumers’ point of view. One such measure
that may be viewed as a proxy for consumer welfare in this setting could be defined by what
we will refer to as the market effectiveness index W : M×M → R, which associates each
strategy profile (A, B) with the value
W(A, B) :=

q(A) · |A ∪ B|+ [q(B)− q(A)] · |B|, if |A| > |B|
q(A) · |A ∪ B| = q(B) · |A ∪ B|, if |A| = |B|
q(B) · |A ∪ B|+ [q(A)− q(B)] · |A|, if |A| < |B|
(5)
This welfare proxy measures how effective a particular market state (A, B) is from the
consumers’ point of view by mapping this state into the actual number of products that is
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available to consumers once the effects of overload have been accounted for. Specifically,
if A is more complex than B, then those consumers who are able to consider A will also
consider B and hence will benefit from being able to choose after processing all products that
are available in the market. On the other hand, those consumers who are overloaded at A
but not at B will only benefit from the products that are contained in the latter menu, while
consumers who are also overloaded at B will not benefit from either of the two available
menus. The market effectiveness index defined by (5) accounts for these forces by adding the
total number of products and those in the least complex menu after these have been scaled
down by the fractions of consumers who consider the former and the latter, respectively.6
We note that our index of market effectiveness is bounded above by k, and this maximum is
achieved when q(X) = 1 and A∪ B = X, i.e. in the case where no consumer is overloaded and
the two firms together offer all possible products. We also note that W is bounded below by
0 and attains this minimum when q(A) = q(B) = 0, i.e. when all consumers are overloaded
at both available menus.
If all products are equi-profitable in the sense that their markups coincide and equal some
w > 0, it follows from (4) that
pii(A, A) =
q(A)
2
· w for i = 1, 2.
Since q(1) = 1 and q is weakly decreasing, this implies that, within the class of symmetric
profiles (A, A), profits are always maximized when |A| = 1. On the other hand, in this class
of symmetric profiles market effectiveness is generally not maximized when firms offer the
same singleton menu. We will return to this point later.
3 The Rational-Consumers Benchmark: Maximum-Variety Equilibrium
We first consider the benchmark case where no consumer is overloaded. This revolves around
the equilibrium capacity of the maximum-variety symmetric profile (X, X) where each firm of-
fers all products. In particular, this is true both under general preferences and equi-profitable
products, i.e.
w1 = . . . = wk,
as well as under general markups and uniformly distributed preferences. The latter assumption
amounts to
pA(x) =
1
|A|
for every menu A, and hence implies that all products in the market are always equally likely
to be chosen.
6Given that, as we argued in footnote 5, our model abstracts from the possibility of markups decreasing whenever the relevant products
are offered by both firms, it is also the case that the potentially beneficial effects to consumers from this kind of competition do not enter
the market effectiveness index. We note, however, that a modification in the direction of allowing for such an effect can easily be made
even without introducing markups as the function’s arguments. Specifically, if the firms’ payoffs are modified as described above by means
of a collection {αA,B : A, B ∈ M}, then (5) could be augmented by adding the term (1− αA,B) · |A ∩ B| to each of its three components,
multiplied by q(A), q(A) = q(B) and q(B), respectively. This formulation encompasses (5) whenever αA,B = 1 for all A, B, whereas if
αA,B < 1, the index is increasing in the number of products offered by both firms and decreasing in αA,B, consistent with intuition.
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Proposition 1.
Suppose no consumer is overloaded at X. Then:
1. Under general preferences and equal markups, (X, X) is the unique equilibrium.
2. Under uniformly distributed preferences and general markups, (X, X) is a strict but generally not
unique equilibrium.
3. Under uniformly distributed preferences and equal markups, (X, X) is an equilibrium in strictly
dominant strategies.
Indeed, consider first the case where preferences are general and all markups are equal
and normalized to one. Conditional on a firm offering menu X, its opponent’s payoff when
itself offers X is 12 , while its payoff from offering any A ⊂ X is strictly lower. Clearly, this is
so because the firm would be foregoing a payoff of 12 · pX(xi) > 0 for each xi ∈ X \ A and,
by assumption, it would be unable to attract any overloaded consumers by offering the less
complex menu A. Hence, (X, X) is a strict equilibrium. Uniqueness follows as a corollary to
Proposition 5 that is stated and discussed in Section 5.
The argument showing that (X, X) is a strict equilibrium in the case of uniformly dis-
tributed preferences and general markups is analogous to the case above.7 The more in-
teresting aspect of this statement, however, is that the maximum-variety equilibrium is not
unique in general. To illustrate this with an example, suppose X = {x1, x2, x3, x4} and
let w1 = w2 = w3 = 1 and w4 = 110 . Suppose also that q(X) = 1. Let Aijk denote
the menu consisting of products xi, xj and xk. It follows from (4) that pi1(A123 , A123) =
1
2 ,
pi1(X, A123) =
32
80 , pi1(A12 , A123) =
1
3 etc. Therefore, (A123 , A123) is an equilibrium. More gener-
ally, non-maximum-variety equilibria also exist even in the absence of overloaded consumers
whenever the least profitable products have markups that are sufficiently lower than the rest,
so that when a firm unilaterally deviates by introducing them it is actually harmed due to the
associated decrease in all products’ choice probabilities outweighing the gains from being the
only firm that offers these low-markup products.
Finally, coming to the case where preferences are uniformly distributed and all products
are equi-profitable, offering X becomes a strictly dominant strategy because, even though
the introduction of more products in the market lowers all choice probabilities and hence the
shared component of the firm’s expected payoff, this loss is more than offset by the firm’s
expected payoff from the products that it offers uniquely. Notably, therefore, this special
case of our model provides another example where Hotelling’s (1929) principle of minimum
product differentiation applies. Finally, since W(X, X) = k, this maximum-variety/minimum-
differentiation equilibrium (X, X) also corresponds to the global maximizer of our market ef-
fectiveness index.
7We note that this conclusion is robust to the presence of some overloaded consumers. In this case, the minimum fraction of non-
overloaded consumers at X, i.e. q(X), is increasing in the cardinality of X.
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4 Uniformly Distributed Preferences
In this section we analyse further the special case of our model where the consumers’ prefer-
ences are uniformly distributed. This assumption allows us to keep the analysis simple and
also makes it easier to identify the effects of choice overload on the menus offered by firms in
equilibrium. One way of motivating it is by thinking of firms as being uncertain about con-
sumers’ preferences, and of expecting the demand for each product to be the same because
of a balancing effect between a product’s desirability on the one hand and its affordability on
the other. We relax this assumption in the next section.
4.1 Minimum-Variety Equilibria
We now turn to the analysis of the opposite extreme case where the market equilibrates in
a minimum-variety state in which the same one product is offered by both firms. It turns out
that our characterization of this special case is also informative in relation to whether other
types of equilibria may also be possible at the same time. Notation-wise, in what follows it is
understood that Ai refers to a menu with i products.
Proposition 2.
Suppose all products are equi-profitable. The following are equivalent:
1. (A1, A1) is an equilibrium.
2. The overload cdf q either coincides with or first-order stochastically dominates the cdf q̂ defined by
q̂(l) := l2l−1 .
3. (Ah, Ah) is an equilibrium if and only if h = 1.
4. (A1, B1) with A1 6= B1 is an equilibrium.
Figure 1: Overload cdf for minimum-variety equilibria
2 4 6 8 10 12
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1.0
q(h)= h
2 h-1
q(h)=ph-1, p=0.66
10
The equivalence between the first two statements suggests that in order for minimum-
variety equilibria to exist in an equal-markups environment it is necessary and sufficient that
the fraction of consumers who are not overloaded at menus of size l > 1 be bounded above
by the threshold q̂(l) = l2l−1 . As also shown in Fig. 1, this threshold cdf q̂ features a sharp
drop in the fraction of non-overloaded consumers when the menu size increases from one to
two, and, being strictly convex, is also such that further drops are decreasing in subsequent
menu-size increments. An example of an overload distribution that satisfies this condition is
the geometric/exponential cdf defined by q(h) := ph−1, provided that p < 23 (Fig. 1). Notably,
the value of the target cdf q̂ as the menu size increases converges to 12 and not to 0. Therefore,
as far as the existence of minimum-variety equilibria is concerned, whether more than half of
the consumers eventually become overloaded as the menu complexity increases is irrelevant.
Proposition 2 further clarifies that for minimum-variety equilibria to occur it is necessary
and sufficient that symmetric equilibria of higher menu complexity do not exist. Intuitively,
the above condition on q shows that for minimum-variety profiles to be equilibria it is neces-
sary that overload increase sharply as menu size goes above one. This, in turn, would make it
profitable for a firm to deviate to a menu of smaller size whenever the starting point is some
profile (Ah, Ah) with h > 1, as this would enable it to absorb a proportion of overloaded
consumers that is sufficiently high to offset the revenue that would have been lost by offer-
ing fewer products. Conversely, for a higher-complexity symmetric profile (Ah, Ah) to be an
equilibrium such deviations to smaller menus must be unprofitable, which necessitates more
gradual overload increases in the consumer population than those necessary for (A1, A1) to
be an equilibrium.
Proposition 2 finally demonstrates that minimum-variety equilibria are possible if and
only if singleton-menu full product differentiation profiles (A1, B1) with A1 6= B1 are also equi-
libria. Intuitively, the firms’ profits are the same across these two equilibrium classes and,
even though this is due to different reasons8, it drives this dual equilibrium property. More-
over, due to equilibrium profits between (A1, A1) and (A1, B1) being equal, and the fact that
the value of the market effectiveness index (i.e. our proxy for consumer welfare) is twice as
high when two distinct products are offered in the market (indeed, both are considered by all
consumers), equilibria in the latter class Pareto-dominate the minimum-variety ones.
4.2 Full Product Differentiation
We now turn to the analysis of more general full product differentiation profiles (A, B) in
which A and B are disjoint menus. Allowing markups to differ, our next result identifies a
sufficient condition for such equilibria to be impossible under all overload cumulative distri-
butions.
Proposition 3.
Suppose w1 and w2 are the highest and second-highest markups, respectively. If w1 ≥ 2 k−1k w2, then
8For profile (A1, A1) the w2 equilibrium payoff is due to the tie-breaking rule and the fact that no consumer is overloaded at singletons,
whereas in the case of (A1, B1) it is due to the latter factor, together with the existence of two distinct products in the market, each of which
is offered uniquely by each firm and is therefore associated with a choice probability of 12 .
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there is no overload cdf q under which a full product differentiation equilibrium exists.
The noteworthy aspect of this result is not the fact that a full product differentiation equi-
librium is impossible when the highest markup is sufficiently higher than the rest. Rather,
what is interesting here is that the factor by which this markup needs to be higher than the
second-largest markup for such a general impossibility to come about is bounded above by
2. Whenever the stated condition is satisfied, both firms will choose to offer a menu that nec-
essarily includes the most profitable alternative because all potential gains from full product
differentiation would be eliminated, making the shape of the overload distribution irrelevant.
Moreover, the condition is such that the distance between the highest- and second-highest
markups depends positively on the total number of products. Intuitively, when there are few
products that firms can choose from, all choice probabilities are bounded below by a rela-
tively high margin (e.g. 13 when k = 3). This in turn provides more leeway for the most
profitable product to stay relatively close, in profitability terms, to the next most profitable
one without losing its ability to attract both sellers to offering it in equilibrium. As the two
firms’ product-differentiation possibilities increase when k becomes large, for the most prof-
itable product x1 to continue to be offered by both firms in every equilibrium its markup must
be sufficiently high to offset the lower payoff that is associated with both firms offering x1
when many other products could have been offered instead.
Turning now to the case where all markups are equal, our next result establishes that non-
singleton full product differentiation equilibria where both firms offer the same number of
products are impossible under a large class of overload distributions.
Proposition 4.
If all products are equi-profitable and overload is uniformly or geometrically distributed, then a full
product differentiation equilibrium (Am, Bm) does not exist for any m ≥ 2.
The assumption of uniformly distributed overload is a natural theoretical benchmark. It
implies that q(h) = k+n+1−hk+h , where, as previously noted, k + n stands for the menu size
of the least overloaded consumer. Since the parameter n is allowed to be positive or nega-
tive, Proposition 4 makes the somewhat surprising prediction that full product differentiation
equilibria with equally sized menus are impossible in such linear environments, regardless
of how fast or slow consumers become overloaded (with the speed determined by k + n) as
complexity increases. The assumption of geometrically/exponentially distributed overload
is also a natural theoretical benchmark and, as already mentioned, it implies that the overload
cdf q is defined by q(h) = ph−1, with p ∈ (0, 1). In our framework, this family of distribu-
tions encompasses a wide range of situations that range from such extreme ones where p is
so close to 1 that consumers are practically never overloaded, to those where p is so close to
0 that essentially all consumers are overloaded in menus with just two products.
Together, Propositions 2 and 4 imply that the only situation where a full product differenti-
ation equilibrium with equally sized menus is possible in this environment is the degenerate
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one in which these menus are singletons.9 Given that all markups and choice probabilities
are the same in this environment, our model makes the strong prediction that the pure ef-
fect of choice overload in this market rules out full product differentiation equilibria under
a wide range of interesting cases. Intuitively, for such profiles (Am, Bm) to be equilibria the
overload cdf q must be such that the ratio q(m)q(m−h) is strictly decreasing at a certain increasing
rate (for h both positive and negative), and, due to the fact that the payoff function changes
as the deviating firm’s menu becomes the relatively more complex one of the two, this ratio
(a function of h) features a kink at h = 0.
Figure 2: Impossibility of a full product differentiation equilibrium
(example of q(m)q(m−h) when m = 4)
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While q(m)q(m−h) is indeed strictly decreasing under both the uniform and geometric distribu-
tions, the rate at which consumers become more or less overloaded as the menu size of the
firm that deviates from profile (Am, Bm) goes above or below m, respectively, is not suffi-
ciently high for all possible deviations. Fig. 2 illustrates this in the case of m = 4, where de-
viations in lower-complexity menus (h > 0) are not profitable but those in higher-complexity
menus (h < 0) are.
4.3 Three- and Four-Product Symmetric Equilibria
In Appendix C we present four real-world contemporary examples from the subscription TV,
broadband, retail banking and laptop computer industries where, in each case, two compet-
ing firms offer menus that contain a minimum of three and a maximum of five products. No-
tably, in each of these examples at least one firm is offering a menu with just three products,
while in two cases (subscription TV contracts and high-end laptops) all four firms have done
so. Several additional real-world market examples that attest to the focality of this number
can also be reported. Although the examples that we provide are such that the sets of three
products offered by each firm are not identical, their degree of substitutability can neverthe-
9As already noted, if overload is geometrically distributed this happens whenever p < 23 , while with uniform overload this is possible
whenever k + n ≤ 4.
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less be considered rather high. To the extent that this is so, and given the impossibility of
equal-menu-size full product differentiation equilibria that we established earlier, such three-
product market outcomes can be modelled in our framework as symmetric profiles (A3, A3).
Be that as it may, a question that one could raise and answer using our model is: Which
specific overload distributions can sustain this symmetric three-product-menu equilibrium?
We answer this question below for the case of uniformly and geometrically distributed over-
load.10
Observation 1.
Suppose all products are equi-profitable. Then:
1. (A3, A3) is an equilibrium under uniformly distributed overload if and only if 6 ≤ k + n ≤ 10.
2. (A3, A3) is an equilibrium under geometrically distributed overload if and only if p ∈ [45 , 78 ].
We note next that another case worth considering along these lines is the one where both
firms offer the same menu of four products. This number is relevant, for example, because,
in addition to being featured in a number of relevant real-world examples, it was, as already
mentioned, also the number that was chosen by the UK energy market regulator, Ofgem, as
the upper bound on the number of gas and electricity tariffs that firms operating in this in-
dustry could offer to consumers.
Observation 2.
Suppose all products are equi-profitable. Then:
1. (A4, A4) is an equilibrium under uniformly distributed overload if and only if 9 ≤ k + n ≤ 13.
2. (A4, A4) is an equilibrium under geometrically distributed overload if and only if p ∈ [67 , 910 ].
Figure 3: Overload distributions for three- and four-product symmetric equilibria
10The simple computational verification is left to the reader.
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The class of such observations that are generated by our model lead to testable empirical
hypotheses.11 In particular, under the maintained assumption that firms in actual markets are
indeed at an equilibrium state when offering three or four products, and that this number is
the same for all firms, it follows from the above two observations that our model makes rather
sharp predictions on how overload evolves. In particular, it suggests that the threshold menu
size of the least overloaded consumer is either 9 or 10 if overload is uniformly distributed, and
that the exponential parameter p is between 67 and
7
8 if overload is geometrically distributed.
As Fig. 3 illustrates in the upper bound case of this “intersection” where k + n = 10 and
p = 78 , these distributions almost coincide in their overload predictions as the menu size in-
creases to contain up to six products, while these predictions diverge significantly beyond
that point. Notably, however, both distributions predict that approximately half of the con-
sumers are overloaded in menus with more than six products. The latter therefore emerges
as a novel insight and a potentially key property for such symmetric profiles to be equilibria
in general. Empirical work that would shed light on the validity of these predictions in real
markets would be particularly welcome and would allow for further modelling refinements.
5 General Preferences
We now relax the assumption that the consumers’ preferences are uniformly distributed. In
particular, throughout this section we assume that products are equi-profitable and focus on
symmetric profiles without imposing any restriction on consumers’ preferences other than
the underlying requirement that all products’ choice probabilities be strictly positive. While
the assumption that all markups are equal is somewhat limiting, it could be justified on the
grounds that it allows for a fairly general analysis to be made in a relatively simple way, and
also on the basis that preferences and markups play a similar (though, as explained in detail
11Observations 1 and 2 could also be extended to the case of general preferences and equal markups that we consider in Section 4.
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later, not identical/substitutable) role in our model.
5.1 Existence and Uniqueness of Symmetric Equilibria
We begin our analysis of the general-preference version of our model with the following char-
acterization.
Proposition 5.
A symmetric profile (A, A) is an equilibrium if and only if the following hold:
1. A contains |A| most preferred products in X;
2. q(B) is sufficiently small relative to q(A) for any menu B such that |B| > |A|;
3. q(C) is not too large relative to q(A) for any menu C such that |C| < |A|.12
Moreover, if (A, A) is an equilibrium, then (B, B) is also an equilibrium if and only if |A| = |B| and
B contains |B| most preferred products in X.
This characterization establishes that, in addition to containing |A| most preferred prod-
ucts, in order for a menu A to be a symmetric equilibrium strategy it must be the case that
sufficiently many consumers are overloaded at menus of sizes different from A relative to
the fraction of consumers that are overloaded at A. The reason is that if the fraction of non-
overloaded consumers is high enough at menus of size different from A, then firms have an
incentive to deviate regardless of what the consumers’ preferences are. It turns out, interest-
ingly, that whenever offering a menu of a certain size is a symmetric equilibrium strategy,
then offering a menu of that size (and with as many most preferred products) is the unique
equilibrium strategy. The intuition is simple and, by now, familiar: assuming that a menu A is
a symmetric equilibrium strategy is equivalent to requiring that sufficiently many consumers
are overloaded at some simpler or more complex menu C relative to A. However, if this is
the case, then C can never be an equilibrium strategy because the fraction of non-overloaded
consumers at A relative to the fraction of non-overloaded consumers at C is too high for it to
be the case. We note, finally, that if offering a menu A is a symmetric equilibrium strategy
and there are unique |A| most preferred products in X, then (A, A) is the unique symmetric
equilibrium in general.
As was anticipated in the discussion of Proposition 1, a corollary to Proposition 5 is that
if no consumer is overloaded at X, then (X, X) is the unique equilibrium. Indeed, it holds in
this case that q(C) = q(X) for all C ⊆ X, hence the third condition of Proposition 5 is always
satisfied, while the first two conditions are trivially satisfied too.
5.2 Symmetric Equilibria and Market Effectiveness
We now focus on the uniform and geometric families of overload distributions that we also
considered in the previous section, and raise the following questions: What is the “consumer-
12See Lemma 3 in Appendix B for a precise formulation of conditions 2 and 3.
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optimal” menu size in each of these cases? Does it differ from the equilibrium menu size? If
so, what kind of quantity regulation should a policy maker impose?
Throughout this subsection we denote by A∗ a menu in the class of symmetric profiles
(A, A) such that (A∗, A∗) maximizes the market effectiveness index. We will call such a menu
consumer-optimal or simply optimal. Unless stated otherwise, A∗ is assumed to contain |A∗|
most preferred products in X. Also, given some real number r, we denote by [r] the value of
the nearest integer function, where half-integers are rounded up to the closest higher integer
number.
We first note that it is a simple implication of the definition of the market effectiveness
index W and the uniform overload cdf q(h) = k+n+1−hk+n that
|A∗| =

[
k+n+1
2
]
, if
[
k+n+1
2
]
≤ k
k, otherwise
(6)
We can now state the following result.
Proposition 6.
Assume that overload is uniformly distributed. Then:
1. (A∗, A∗) is an equilibrium if and only if |A∗| = 1 or |A∗| = k and k + n is sufficiently large;
2. (A∗, A∗) is not an equilibrium if and only if firms can profitably deviate to simpler menus.
Proposition 6 contains two economically relevant messages. First, a symmetric profile that
maximises market effectiveness is an equilibrium in this environment only in the polar cases
in which minimum- or maximum-variety profiles maximise market effectiveness. In the latter
case, the menu-size threshold at which the least overloaded consumers actively choose (hence
the parameter n too) has to be sufficiently high to ensure that offering the most complex menu
of all is an equilibrium strategy. The reason is that if a maximum-variety profile is consumer-
optimal and the fraction of non-overloaded consumers is not high enough, then firms can
profitably deviate to simpler menus.13
Second, except in the extreme cases discussed above, a symmetric profile that maximises
market effectiveness is never attained as an equilibrium, as firms can always profitably devi-
ate to simpler menus. Moreover, Proposition 6 also suggests that deviating to more complex
menus is never profitable. Hence, in equilibrium, the degree of product variety is smaller
compared to what would be optimal for consumers. The intuition behind this is two-fold.
On the one hand, under uniform overload the fraction of non-overloaded consumers at op-
timal or simpler menus is large enough (i.e., at least 12 ) to make deviations to more complex
menus unprofitable. On the other hand, the fraction of non-overloaded consumers at simpler
menus relative to the fraction of non-overloaded consumers at the optimal menu is too large
13For example, assume that X = {x1, x2, x3} and n = 2. Then, the optimal menu size is 3. Assume that choice probabilities are pX (x1) =
0.4, pX (x2) = 0.35, and pX (x3) = 0.25. Notice that pi1(X, X) = 0.3 < pi1({x1}, X) = 0.52.
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for the latter to be offered in a symmetric equilibrium. This is so because, under uniform
overload, the rate at which the fraction of non-overloaded consumer increases as complexity
decreases is too high compared to what would be the optimal amount. Therefore, assum-
ing that overload is uniformly distributed and the market environment is such that only
symmetric equilibria are possible, a policy implication of Proposition 6 is that a regulatory
intervention should impose a lower bound on product variety.
We now turn to the case where overload is geometrically distributed and hence q(h) =
ph−1, p ∈ (0, 1). We first note that a joint implication of this assumption and the definition of
the market effectiveness index W is that
|A∗| =

1, if p ≤ 1e[
− 1ln(p)
]
, if p ∈
[
1
e ,
1
e1/k
]
k, otherwise.14
(7)
The following result can now be stated.
Proposition 7.
Assume that overload is geometrically distributed. Then:
1. If |A∗| = 1, (A∗, A∗) is an equilibrium;
2. If (A∗, A∗) is an equilibrium, either |A∗| = 1 or |A∗| = k;
3. (A∗, A∗) is not an equilibrium if and only if firms can profitably deviate to simpler menus.
In the uniform overload case, increasing menu complexity results in the fraction of over-
loaded consumers to increase linearly. On the contrary, under geometric overload, the frac-
tion of overloaded consumers grows exponentially as menu complexity increases. Despite
this difference, and similar to the impossibility result that we obtained in Proposition 4 under
these two families of distributions, the market-effectiveness results under geometric overload
are analogous from a qualitative point of view to those under uniform overload. That is, of-
fering an optimal menu is an equilibrium strategy only in the polar cases in which the optimal
menu size is either 1 or k.
However, unlike in the uniform case, whenever the optimal menu size is k, increasing the
menu-size threshold k+ n of the least overloaded consumers does not make unprofitable any
deviations to menus simpler than the maximum-variety menu. The reason is that, under
geometric overload, a change in k + n does not affect the shape of the overload distribu-
tion. In addition, it can be shown that when the parameter p is sufficiently small, offering
a maximum-variety menu is an equilibrium strategy whenever it is consumer-optimal to do
so.15 However, if p is large enough, then whether offering a maximum-variety menu is an
equilibrium depends on consumers’ preferences.16
15Details are available from the authors upon request.
16An example is provided at the end of Appendix B.
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Proposition 7 also suggests that, like in the uniform case, firms can profitably deviate from
a consumer-optimal menu only by offering a simpler menu. The reasons are the same as
those under the uniform case: (i) the fraction of consumers that are not overloaded at more
complex menus is too small to make it profitable for firms to increase product variety; (ii)
too many consumers are not overloaded at menus simpler than the optimal menu. We draw
two economic implications. First, assuming that only symmetric equilibria are possible, the
market by itself is able to achieve consumer optimality only in extreme cases. Second, in all
those other cases where the market fails to do so, a policy intervention can improve upon the
market outcome by imposing a lower bound on product variety.
This novel lower-cap policy implication that our model delivers in these environments
may seem counter-intuitive. However, we note that this is partly driven by our building-
block assumption (which, as was discussed, is backed by a large body of relevant empirical
work) that consumers who are overloaded by both firms are lost to the market and thus yield
zero profit to firms. This exercises a downward pressure on the size of the menus that firms
choose to offer. In the above two cases it turns out that it is only in extreme cases that this
force is sufficiently strong for the symmetric optima to be attainable as equilibria. Yet, we
note that there is no reason to expect that this would continue to be the policy message if the
payoff and welfare proxy/market effectiveness functions had been specified differently so as
to capture, for example, the intuition that consumers choose at random instead of deferring
choice altogether as menu complexity increases.
5.3 On the Role of Preferences and Markups in the Model
We conclude this section with a qualitative comparison of our analysis under the uniform
preferences/general markups and general preferences/equal markups frameworks that we
have considered in this paper. We will argue that this dichotomy is non-redundant and allows
us to gain insights from different perspectives on the market we study.
In particular, assuming a given and fixed overload distribution, it follows from our anal-
ysis that even though a unique level of menu/market complexity may arise in symmetric
equilibrium when preferences are unrestricted (cf Proposition 6 for the case of uniformly dis-
tributed overload), multiple symmetric equilibria –with varying menu sizes– may exist when
markups are unrestricted instead (cf Proposition 1 in the case where overload is distributed
in such a way that q(X) = 1). Indeed, consider the example where X = {x1, x2, x3, x4} and
suppose that no consumer is overloaded at X. As in the non-unique equilibrium example
that was discussed after the statement of Proposition 1, assume first that markups are such
that w1 = w2 = w3 = 1 and w4 = 1/10, and that choice probabilities pX(xi) are equal for
all i ≤ 4. In this case, both (X, X) and ({x1, x2, x3}, {x1, x2, x3}) are equilibria. Next, suppose
that markups are such that w1 = w2 = w3 = w4 = 1. Notice that offering X is a best response
to the opponent offering any menu, regardless of how choice probabilities are structured.
Therefore, (X, X) is the unique symmetric equilibrium.
The above remarks suggest that if we were to define a (possibly multi-valued) mapping
from the set of symmetric-equilibrium market complexity levels into the set of overload dis-
tributions, then we would say that such a mapping is injective only when preferences are
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allowed to remain general/unrestricted. Indeed, unlike in this case, the same overload dis-
tribution may correspond to different equilibrium complexity levels when markups are het-
erogeneous. Hence, although similar, markups and preferences do indeed play distinct roles
in our model, with markup heterogeneity often encompassing more degrees of freedom.
Further to the above, the example below illustrates the strong sense in which preferences
and markups in our model are not substitutable. Suppose X = {x1, x2, x3, x4} and let the
overload distribution q be such that q(1) = 1, q(2) = 0.9, q(3) = 0.8 and q(4) = 0.7. Consider
first the case where markups are equal and such that w1 = w2 = w3 = w4 = 0.25 while
preferences are heterogeneous and such that pX(x1) = pX(x2) = pX(x3) = 0.3, pX(x4) = 0.1.
It holds that pi1(X, X) = 0.0875, pi1({x1, x2}, X) = 0.08375, pi1({x1, x2, x3}, X) = 0.07, etc.
Hence, (X, X) is an equilibrium. On the other hand, pi1({x1, x2}, {x1, x2}) = 0.1125 and
pi1(X, {x1, x2}) = 0.12. Hence, ({x1, x2}, {x1, x2}) is not an equilibrium. Consider now the
symmetric case of the example in which the above non-uniform preference structure is re-
placed by an identical heterogeneous-markup structure, i.e. w1 = w2 = w3 = 0.3, w4 = 0.1,
and assume also that choice probabilities are equal: pX(x1) = pX(x2) = pX(x3) = pX(x4) =
0.25. It now holds that pi1(X, X) = 0.0875, pi1({x1, x2, x3}, X) = 0.1125 and, in addition,
pi1({x1, x2}, {x1, x2}) = 0.27, pi1({x1, x2, x3}, {x1, x2}) = 0.24, pi1(X, {x1, x2}) = 0.18, etc.
Therefore, in sharp contrast to the predictions made previously, ({x1, x2}, {x1, x2}) is an equi-
librium here but not (X, X).
6 Related Literature
The broad literature which our paper belongs to attempts to analyze the effects of various
forms of consumer bounded rationality on the outcome of firm competition. Examples in-
clude consumer loss aversion (Heidhues and Ko¨szegi, 2008; Karle and Peitz, 2014; Carbajal
and Ely, 2016), inattention (Eliaz and Spiegler, 2011; de Clippel, Eliaz, and Rozen, 2014; Bor-
dalo, Gennaioli, and Shleifer, 2016; Manzini and Mariotti, 2017), bounded-rational expectations
(Gabaix and Laibson, 2006; Spiegler, 2006), comparison difficulty (Piccione and Spiegler, 2012;
Bachi and Spiegler, 2014; Papi, 2014) and satisficing (Papi, 2017).17 In sharp contrast to many
of these models where firms add complexity/obfuscation to their price structures and hence
manage to sustain positive markups, our analysis highlights the potentially beneficial effect
that menu simplicity can have in the firms’ efforts to increase their market share.
More closely related to our model is Kamenica’s (2008), where consumer demand for a
monopolist’s menu may be decreasing in the number of products contained in it because
consumers who are uninformed about their preferences make the “contextual inference” that
a smaller menu includes the most popular alternatives, and hence choose one of these due
to the higher probability that it will be a good match for them. Our model is different in
that small menus may be offered in the market as the equilibrium outcome of duopolistic
competition, and with the latter taking place in the presence of cognitively constrained con-
sumers who are fully aware of their preferences. Bachi and Spiegler (2014) propose a class of
duopolistic models where consumers are presented with two-attribute products in Euclidean
17A textbook treatment of this literature is provided in Spiegler (2011), while Spiegler (2016) surveys and synthesizes some more recent
developments and trends.
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space and experience difficulties in making trade-offs across these attributes. Their “opt-in”
model, in particular, deals with the case where consumers actually defer choice due to such
comparison difficulties, for example when none of the feasible alternatives is Pareto domi-
nant in a menu. Although choice overload as analyzed here is not a source of deferral for
consumers in the Bachi-Spiegler model, that paper studies the effects that indecisiveness-
driven deferral18 has on market outcomes.
Anderson et al (1992, section 7.4) study the equilibrium properties of an oligopolistic mar-
ket for differentiated products in which consumer demand is determined by the multino-
mial logit model when an outside option is present. With demand solely determined by this
special class of random utility models, the outside option there is chosen only when it is
perceived as more attractive than the actual available products.19 By contrast, consumer de-
mand in our setting is not determined by some random utility model and the outside option
is chosen only when consumers are overloaded.
Klemperer and Padilla (1997) propose a model in which rational consumers prefer to buy
from a single seller due to the presence of shopping costs. In that model firms have an in-
centive to increase the variety of the offered menu in order to decrease its opponents’ market
shares. The authors show that this can lead to a socially undesirable outcome, as the reduc-
tion in the opponents’ profits may outweigh the increase in consumers’ surplus. Therefore,
unlike the welfare conclusions that stem from our analysis, in that model the occurrence of
large equilibrium menus can be socially inefficient not because of the socially sub-optimal
number of consumers who can benefit from them but due to possible rival-foreclosing effect
that is implied by the consumers’ tendency to buy from few sellers.
In addition to the overload-constrained maximization model that is analyzed in Gerasi-
mou (2018) and which our consumers have been assumed to conform with, other decision-
theoretic models in which smaller menus are in some sense better for the decision maker
are proposed in Billot and Thisse (1999), Mullainathan (2002), Sarver (2008), Tyson (2008),
Kuksov and Villas-Boas (2010), Ortoleva (2013), Buturak and Evren (2018), Frick (2016) and
Dean et al (2017). The reasons for such behavior vary across these models and include regret
as well as cognitive costs/attention constraints. Finally, the reader is referred to Chatterjee
and Sabourian (2000) for a multi-person bargaining model where players are also assumed to
be facing computational costs which, in that context, limit the degree to which their strategies
can depend on the game’s history.
7 Concluding Remarks
When oligopolistically competitive firms sell their products to consumers who are potentially
choice-overloaded in the sense that they avoid/indefinitely defer making an active choice
when they see too many products in a menu, such firms are faced with a novel strategic
trade-off. In the context of this trade-off, a firm that offers many products appeals to many
18For a revealed-preference analysis of indecisiveness-driven choice deferral that is caused by the absence, respectively, of a partially or
totally dominant option due to preference incompleteness, the reader is referred to Gerasimou (2016, 2018).
19Gerasimou (2018) also provides a revealed-preference analysis of undesirability/unattractiveness of the alternatives as a source of choice
deferral in a deterministic setting.
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consumers’ tastes, but at the same time potentially overloads these consumers and hence
either loses them to its rival or drives them out of the market altogether. This paper proposes
the first model in the literature that aims to provide a framework for thinking about this
strategic trade-off in a simple and general way.
From a policy point of view, the presence of overloaded consumers calls for re-thinking
about conventional measures of welfare such as consumer surplus, as these fail to capture
the possibility that certain market outcomes may be harmful not because of high equilibrium
prices or markups, but because, due to cognitive constraints, a potentially significant fraction
of the consumer population may not actually benefit from the products that are made avail-
able through the equilibrium market outcome. Our paper proposes a simple notion of market
effectiveness that may be viewed as a proxy for consumer welfare in such an environment,
and which may be relevant in this regard. Using this measure alongside our market model
enabled us to analyse the equilibrium potential in the class of consumer-optimal symmetric
strategy profiles and, perhaps surprisingly, arrive at the conclusion that, under uniformly or
geometrically/exponentially distributed overload, a policy intervention can improve upon
the market outcome by imposing a lower rather than an upper bound on the number of
products that firms can offer.
Although our model assumes that consumers are not already endowed with a default mar-
ket alternative, a potentially interesting extension would feature a formulation that would
allow for such defaults to exist and influence the consumers’ (hence the firms’) decisions
accordingly. This extension, in particular, would allow one to study equilibria where con-
sumers do or do not switch away from their default market options and, as such, would be
particularly suitable for the theoretical analysis of relevant policy questions.
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Appendices
A The Consumer’s Decision Process
As discussed in the main text, our consumers are assumed to face cognitive costs during their
decision-making process which, when high enough, induce overload-driven choice deferral.
In particular, we assume that their behaviour is described by a special case of the overload-
constrained utility maximization model that is developed and axiomatically characterized in
Gerasimou (2018). In this special case of the model the consumer’s within-menu behavior is
guided by a utility function u : X → R and a complexity threshold n (an integer), and is such
that for all A, B inM and all x, y, z in X,
C(A) =

arg max
x∈A
u(x), iff |A| ≤ n
∅, otherwise
(8)
In our model we assumed that preferences were strict, which translates into the utility func-
tion u being injective.
Turning to the consumer’s between-menu decision in the duopolistic market that we con-
sider, let us define D := M×M = {(A, B)} : A, B ∈ M} as the collection of all pairs of
menus in M, and let M∗ := M∪ ∅. Consistent with the way in which the model in the
main text was set up and motivated, the consumer’s active choice or deferral in this class of
decision problems is captured by the mapping S : D →M∗ ∪D that is defined by
S(A, B) =

A, if |A| ≤ n < |B|, or
|A|, |B| ≤ n & max
x∈A
u(x) > max
x∈B
u(x)
B, if |B| ≤ n < |A|, or
|A|, |B| ≤ n & max
x∈B
u(x) > max
x∈A
u(x)
{A, B}, if |A|, |B| ≤ n & max
x∈A
u(x) = max
x∈B
u(x)
∅, if |A|, |B| > n
(9)
In words, the consumer chooses menu A (offered by firm 1) over B (offered by firm 2) either
if B is considered complex and A is not, or if both A and B are non-complex but the agent’s
most preferred option is in A. The case where B is chosen over A is symmetric. The consumer
is indifferent between A and B and may choose one of them at random if both menus are non-
complex and contain his most preferred option. Finally, the consumer defers when both A
and B are complex.
This specification effectively assumes that the consumer uses a lexicographic rule in deci-
sions between menus, whereby he first compares them according to complexity and only
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resorts to his preferences when both menus are non-complex. This is consistent with our gen-
eral approach of modelling consumers as trying to make decisions by minimizing cognitive
effort. However, as we also highlighted in the main text, caution should be exercised in the
interpretation of the consumer’s postulated decision process when his preferences come into
play. In particular, when faced with the pair of menus (A, B) our consumer may be thought
of as pre-scanning A at some point in time, first according to the cardinality criterion and, if
it is considered to be non-complex, then and only then as employing his preferences. He is
also assumed to do the same with menu B at a later point. If both menus are non-complex, he
compares the two best options in each of them and chooses his menu accordingly. Therefore,
he is never confronted with A ∪ B as a single menu.
To capture the implications of the above deterministic consumer decision process for ag-
gregate market shares, and thus to motivate the payoff function that is laid out in (4), let
P(x|A, B) stand for the choice probability of x when A and B are offered by the two firms. In
light of the above, it holds that
P(x|A, B) =

1
2 · q(A) · pA∪B(x) + [q(B)− q(A)]pB(x), if x ∈ A ∩ B & |A| > |B|
1
2 · q(B) · pA∪B(x) + [q(A)− q(B)]pA(x), if x ∈ A ∩ B & |B| > |A|
1
2 · q(A) · pA∪B(x) = q(B) · 12 · pA∪B(x), if x ∈ A ∩ B & |A| = |B|
q(A) · pA∪B(x), if x ∈ A \ B
q(B) · pA∪B(x), if x ∈ B \ A
Therefore, as the above equations suggest, due to the fact that the consumers’ outside option
is not modelled as an element of X, the choice probabilities of the elements in A ∪ B do not
sum to 1 whenever q(A) < 1 or q(B) < 1. This is a reflection of the effect that choice overload
has in our market.
B Proofs
Lemma 1.
Assume that preferences are uniformly distributed and all markups are equal. Let |A| = a, |B| = b,
and |A ∩ B| = c. Then:
1. pi1(A, B) is constant in c whenever a = b.
2. pi1(A, B) is strictly increasing in c whenever a > b, and
3. pi1(A, B) is strictly decreasing in c whenever b > a.
Proof of Lemma 1:
Let the common markup w be normalized to w = 1. Assume that a = b. Then, the profit
of a firm offering A when the opponent offers B is a−ca+b−c +
1
2
c
a+b−c =
2a−c
2(a+b−c) := p¯i. It is clear
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that this is constant in c when a = b. Next, suppose that a > b. Then, pi1(A, B) = q(A)p¯i. It
is easy to see that this is strictly increasing in c when a > b.Finally, assume that b > a. Then,
pi1(A, B) = q(B)p¯i + q(A)− q(B). It is again straightforward to verify that this is strictly de-
creasing in c whenever b > a. 
Proof of Proposition 1:
The proof of the first part of the proposition is straightforward and omitted (see also the
discussion in the main text). We will prove the second part. In particular, we will show
that if preferences are uniformly distributes and all markups are equal, then, for any A, B ∈
M, pi1(X, B) > pi1(A, B). Without loss of generality, normalize the common markup to 1.
Consider firm 1 and suppose to the contrary that there are A ⊂ X and B ⊆ X such that
pi1(A, B) ≥ pi1(X, B). We have
pi1(A, B) = ∑
i∈IA\B
pA∪B(xi) +
1
2 ∑j∈IA∩B
pA∪B(xj)
pi1(X, B) = ∑
i∈IX\B
pX(xi) +
1
2 ∑j∈B
pX(xj)
and
∑
i∈IA\B
pA∪B(xi) +
1
2 ∑j∈IA∩B
pA∪B(xj) ≥ ∑
i∈IX\B
pX(xi) +
1
2 ∑j∈IB
pX(xj).
Moreover, by assumption, pE∪F(xi) = pE∪F(xj) :=
1
|E∪F| for all E, F ∈ M and all xi, xj ∈ E ∪ F.
Therefore,
∑
i∈IA\B
pA∪B(xi) +
1
2 ∑j∈IA∩B
pA∪B(xj) =
|A \ B|
|A ∪ B| +
1
2
|A ∩ B|
|A ∪ B|
∑
i∈IX\B
pX(xi) +
1
2 ∑j∈IB
pX(xj) =
|X \ B|
k
+
1
2
|B|
k
Suppose |A| = n, |B| = m and A ∩ B = ∅, so that m + n ≤ k. We have pi1(A, B) = nm+n and
pi1(X, B) = k−mk +
1
2
m
k . Thus,
pi1(A, B) ≥ pi1(X, B) ⇐⇒ m + n2 ≥ k
Since n + m ≤ k, this is clearly false. Therefore, for no such A and B is it true that pi1(A, B) ≥
pi1(X, B).
It remains to be shown that m+n2 ≥ k is also false when A ∩ B 6= ∅ and A ∪ B ⊂ X. As
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before, assume |A| = n, |B| = m and let |A ∩ B| = l. It holds that
pi1(A, B) =
n− l
m + n− l +
1
2
l
m + n− l =
2n− l
2(m + n− l)
pi1(X, B) =
k−m
k
+
1
2
m
k
=
2k−m
2k
We distinguish three cases.
Case (i): n > m. By Lemma 1, pi1(A, B) is strictly increasing in l. Hence, it suffices to
compare the two payoffs when this attains its maximum value, i.e. at l = m. When l = m,
pi1(A, B) ≥ pi1(X, B) if and only if n ≥ k, which is obviously false.
Case (ii): n = m. By Lemma 1, pi1(A, B) is constant in l. Hence, assume without loss of
generality that l = m. When l = m, pi1(A, B) ≥ pi1(X, B) if and only if n ≥ k, which is false.
Case (iii): n < m. By Lemma 1, pi1(A, B) is strictly decreasing in l. Hence, let l = 1. When
l = 1, pi1(A, B) ≥ pi1(X, B) if and only if n ≥ m, which is false.
Therefore, pi1(X, B) > pi1(A, B) for all A 6= X 6= B ∈ M. Since the game is symmetric, this
proves that (X, X) is a strictly dominant strategy equilibrium. 
Proof of Proposition 2.
1 ⇔ 2. The common markup is normalized to 1 throughout the proof. Assume that both
firms offer the same menu A1, where |A1| = 1. Since q(1) = 1 by assumption, (A1, A1) is an
equilibrium if and only if pi1(A, A1) ≤ 12 for every A ∈ M. Note first that pi1(A, A1) = 12 =
pi1(A1, A1) for all A ∈ M such that |A| = 1. Suppose a firm deviates to A ∈ M such that
|A| ∈ {2, . . . , k}. By Lemma 1, profits from this deviation are maximized whenever |A ∩ A1|
is maximized. Hence, without loss of generality assume that A ⊃ A1. The deviating firm
obtains q(A)
[ |A|−1
|A| +
1
2
1
|A|
]
. The deviation is not profitable if and only if q(A)
[
2|A|−1
2|A|
]
≤ 12
or, equivalently, q(A) ≤ |A|2|A|−1 for any |A| > 1. Define the cdf q̂ by q̂(A) := |A|2|A|−1 . It follows
from the above that (A1, A1) is an equilibrium if and only if q coincides with or first-order
stochastically dominates q̂.
2⇒ 3. In view of the above equivalence, (A1, A1) is an equilibrium by assumption. Suppose
to the contrary that (Ah, Ah) is also an equilibrium for some h > 1. It holds that pi1(Ah, Ah) =
q(h)
2 ≥ pi1(A, Ah) for all A ∈ M. From Lemma (1), it is not profitable for firm 1 to deviate
to a menu A with A ∩ Ah 6= ∅. Consider, therefore, a deviation to some menu Bm such that
Bm ∩ Ah 6= ∅. It holds that pi1(Ah, Ah) ≥ pi1(Bm, Ah) for all possible m. Suppose m = 1.
It follows from the above inequality that q(h)2 ≥ 1h+1 + 1− q(h) which is true if and only if
q(h) ≥ 2h+43h+3 . However, it holds by assumption that q(h) ≤ h2h−1 . Moreover, 2h+43h+3 > h2h−1 is
true for all h > 1. Therefore, we arrive at the contradiction that pi1(B1, Ah) > pi1(Ah, Ah).
3⇒ 4. Suppose (Ah, Ah) is an equilibrium if and only if h = 1. It holds that pi1(A1, A1) = 12 =
pi1(A1, B1) for A1 6= B1. Consider a deviation by firm 1 to a profile A where |A| > 1. Assume
first that A∩ B1 = ∅. In view of the 1⇔ 2 equivalence that was established above, and given
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the definition of q̂, it follows that pi1(A, B1) ≤ |A|2|A|−1 · |A||A|+1 = |A|
2
2|A|2+|A|−1 <
1
2 . Now suppose
A ∩ B1 6= ∅. It follows from Lemma 1 that pi1(A, B1) is maximized when A = B1. Therefore,
(A1, B1) with A1 6= B1 is also an equilibrium.
4 ⇒ 1. Suppose (A1, B1) is an equilibrium for A1 6= B1. It holds that pi1(A1, B1) = 12 ≥
pi1(A, B1) for all A ∈ M. In particular, pi1(B, B1) ≤ 12 for all B ⊇ B1 and pi1(A, B1) ≤ 12 for
all A ⊇ A1. It follows from the first set of equilibrium inequalities that 12 = pi1(B1, B1) ≥
pi1(B, B1) for all B ⊇ B1. It also follows from the second set of equilibrium inequalities that
1
2 = pi1(B1, B1) ≥ pi1(A, B1) for all A ∈ M such that A ∩ B1 = ∅. Therefore, (B1, B1) is an
equilibrium. 
Proof of Proposition 3.
Assume without loss of generality that |A| ≥ |B|, and A ∩ B = ∅. Let the markups of the
products in A be such that wA1 ≥ wA2 ≥ · · · ≥ wA|A| and those in B such that wB1 ≥ wB2 ≥ · · · ≥
wB|B|. We have
pi(A, B) = q(A) ·
(
∑i∈IA w
A
i
|A|+ |B|
)
(10)
Assume first that wB1 > w
A
|A|. Define A
′ as the menu of |A| products that is identical to A
except that the least profitable product xA|A| in A is replaced by x
B
1 in B. We have
pi(A′, B) = q(A) ·
(
∑i∈IA\{|A|} wi
|A|+ |B| − 1 +
1
2
wB1
|A|+ |B| − 1
)
(11)
Let K := ∑i∈IA\{|A|} w
A
i . Suppose that (A, B) is an equilibrium. It follows from (10) and (11)
that
q(A) ·
(
K
|A|+ |B| +
wA|A|
|A|+ |B|
)
≥ q(A) ·
(
K
|A|+ |B| − 1 +
1
2
wB1
|A|+ |B| − 1
)
(12)
Since wB1 > w
A
|A|, we can write w
B
1 = α · wA|A| for some α > 1. Substituting this back into (12)
and rearranging, we get
wA|A|
(
|A|+ |B| − 1− α
2
|A| − α
2
|B|
)
≥ K (13)
Observe that the assumption on how markpus in A are distributed implies that K ≥ (|A| −
1) · wA|A|. Therefore, it follows from (13) that wA|A|
(|A|+ |B| − 1− α2 |A| − α2 |B|) ≥ (|A| − 1) ·
wA|A|, which is equivalent to |B| ≥ α2 (|A|+ |B|). Since |A| ≥ |B|, then in the most favourable
case |A| = |B| implying that 1 ≥ α, which leads to a contradiction.
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Now assume that wB1 ≤ wA|A|. We have
pi(B, A) = q(A) ·
(
∑i∈IB w
B
i
|A|+ |B|
)
+ q(B)− q(A) (14)
If the most profitable product in X does not belong to either A or B, then it is obvious that
both firms have an incentive to deviate by replacing any product they offer with the most
profitable product. Hence, assume that the most profitable product belongs to A. Hence, wA1
is its markup. Define B′ as the menu of |B| products that is identical to B except that the least
profitable product xB|B| in B is replaced by x
A
1 in A. We have
pi(B′, A) = q(A)
(
∑i∈IB\{|B|} w
B
i
|A|+ |B| − 1 +
1
2
wA1
|A|+ |B| − 1
)
+ q(B)− q(A) (15)
Let L := ∑i∈IB\{|B|} w
B
i . Suppose that (A, B) is an equilibrium. It follows from (14) and (15)
that
q(A)
(
L
|A|+|B| +
wB|B|
|A|+|B|
)
+ q(B)− q(A)
≥ (16)
q(A)
(
L
|A|+|B|−1 +
1
2
wA1
|A|+|B|−1
)
+ q(B)− q(A)
By rearranging (16) and solving for wA1 we get
wA1 ≤
2|A|
|A|+ |B|w
′
|B| + G (17)
where G :=
(|B|−1)w′|B|−L
|A|+|B| . Since L ≥ (|B| − 1)wB|B|−1 and wB|B|−1 ≥ wB|B|, then G ≤ 0.
Assume first that |A| = |B|. Then, (17) reduces to
wA1 ≤ w′|B| + G
Since wA1 > w
′
|B| and G ≤ 0, the inequality is false, which is a contradiction.
Next, assume that |A| > |B|. In the most favourable case it holds that |A| = k− 1, |B| = 1,
and w′|B| = w3, implying that (17) reduces to
w1 ≤ 2(k− 1)k w3 + G
Since G ≤ 0 and w1 ≥ 2(k−1)k w2 by assumption, this inequality is false, which leads to a con-
tradiction. 
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Lemma 2.
Suppose all products are equi-profitable. A full product differentiation equilibrium (Am, Bm) with
m > 1 exists if and only if the overload cdf q satisfies
q(m)
q(m− h) ≥

6m−4h
6m−3h , h = 1, . . . , m− 1
2m−2h
2m−h , h = −(k−m), . . . ,−1
(18)
Proof of Lemma 2.
By definition, a profile (Am, Bm) with Am ∩ Bm = ∅ is an equilibrium if and only if
pi1(Am, Bm) ≥ pi1(A, Bm) for every menu A. Since Am ∩ Bm = ∅ and |Am| = |Bm| = m,
it holds that
pi1(Am, Bm) =
q(m)
2
.
We consider three possible cases for the deviating menu A:
Case 1: A = Am−h ⊂ Am for h = 1, . . . , m − 1. It holds that pi1(Am−h, Bm) = q(m −
h) m−h2m−h + q(m− h)− q(m). Therefore, pi1(Am, Bm) ≥ pi1(A, Bm) if and only if q(m)2 ≥ q(m−
h) m−h2m−h + q(m− h)− q(m) which is true if and only if
q(m) ≥ 6m− 4h
6m− 3h · q(m− h) (19)
Case 2: A ∩ Bm 6= ∅. It follows from Lemma 1 that
max
A∩Bm 6=∅
pi1(A, Bm) = pi1(Bm, Bm) =
q(m)
2
= pi1(Am, Bm).
Therefore, deviating to such a menu A is not profitable.
Case 3: Am+h ∩ Bm = ∅ for h = 1, . . . , k−m. It holds that pi1(Am+h, Bm) = q(m + h) m+h2m+h .
Thus, pi1(Am, Bm) ≥ pi1(Am+h, Bm) if and only if q(m)2 ≥ q(m + h) m+h2m+h which is true if and
only if
q(m) ≥ 2m + 2h
2m + h
q(m + h) (20)
Rearranging (19), (20) and rewriting the latter inequality in an equivalent way where h takes
negative instead of positive values results in condition (18). 
Proof of Proposition 4.
Consider the case of uniformly distributed overload. The cdf q in this case is defined by
q(h) = k+n+1−hk+n . Let m be such that 1 < m ≤ k + n (the case where k + n < m ≤ k can
be ignored as both firms earn zero payoffs at such (Am, Bm), which implies that this profile
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cannot be an equilibrium). We have
q(m)
q(m− h) =
k + n + 1−m
k + n + 1−m + h , h = −min{(k + n−m), (k−m)}, . . . , m− 1. (21)
Given Lemma 2 and condition (18), the following are implied by (21):
m ≤ 4h + k + n + 1
7
, h = 1, . . . , m− 1 (22)
m ≥ k + n + 1− 2h
3
, h = 1, . . . , min{(k + n−m), (k−m)} (23)
Since the terms on the right hand side of (22) and (23) are increasing and decreasing in h,
respectively, they attain their lowest and highest values, respectively, when h = 1. In partic-
ular, when h = 1 they imply that 7m ≤ 6 + k + n and 3m ≥ k + n− 1. Subtracting the latter
inequality from the former yields 4m ≤ 7, which is impossible given the requirement that
m ≥ 2.
Now suppose that overload is geometrically distributed according to q(h) = ph−1, p ∈
(0, 1). For any m ∈ {2, . . . , [ k2 ]}, (18) becomes
pm−1
pm−1−h
≡ ph ≥

6m−4h
6m−3h , h = 1, . . . , m− 1
2m−2h
2m−h , h = −(k−m), . . . ,−1
(24)
We will first show that, for any m ≥ 2, g(h) := ph ≥ 6m−4h6m−3h := fm(h) for all h > 1 if it is true
for h = 1. Observe that g′(h) = ln(p) · ph < 0 and g′′(h) = ln(p)2 · ph > 0 for all p ∈ (0, 1).
Moreover, f ′m(h) = − 6m(6m−3h)2 < 0 and f ′′m(h) = − 36m(6m−3h)3 < 0 for all h ≥ 1. Therefore, for all
m ≥ 2 it holds that g′′(h) > f ′′m(h) for all h ≥ 1 (i.e. f is decreasing at a higher rate than g).
Thus, given an arbitrary m ≥ 2, in order to show that g(h) ≥ fm(h) for all h = 1, . . . , m− 1 it
suffices to show that there exists p ∈ (0, 1) such that g(1) ≡ p ≥ fm(1).
Similarly, let sm(h) := 2m−2h2m−h . As above, we will show that in order for g(h) ≥ sm(h) to be
true for all h < −1 given some arbitrary m ≥ 2 it suffices to show that it is true for h = −1
under some p ∈ (0, 1). Indeed, observe that g′′(h) > 0 and s′′m(h) = − 4m(2m−h)3 < 0 for all
h ≤ −1. Therefore, for any m ≥ 2 it holds that g′′(h) > s′′m(h) for all all h ≤ −1.
It follows from the above that, given some some m ≥ 2, (24) is satisfied only if
p ≥ 6m− 4
6m− 3 (25)
1
p
≥ 2m + 2
2m + 1
(26)
However, since 6m−46m−3 >
2m+1
2m+2 for all m ≥ 2, there is no p ∈ (0, 1) that makes both (25) and
(26) true. Therefore, for each m ≥ 2 there is no p ∈ (0, 1) such that (Am, Bm) is a full product
differentiation equilibrium if q(h) = ph−1. 
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Notational remark: Given a strategy profile (A, B), we let UAAB := ∑i∈IA\B pA∪B(xi) and SAB :=
∑i∈IA∩B pA∪B(xi). Notice that, by definition, U
A
AB + SAB +U
B
AB = 1.
Normalization: The following results assume products to be equi-profitable. For this reason,
the common markup is normalized to 1 throughout the proofs.
Lemma 3.
A profile (A, A) is an equilibrium if and only if A contains |A| most preferred products in X and, for
any B, C ∈ M such that |B| > |A| and |C| < |A|, the following two conditions hold:
q(B)
q(A)
≤ 1
2UBAB + SAB
(27)
q(C)
q(A)
≤ 3− 2U
B
AB − SAB
2
(28)
Proof of Lemma 3:
It is immediate that if A ∈ M does not contain |A| most preferred products in X, then
each firm can profitably deviate by replacing a less preferred product with a more preferred
one. Let B, C ∈ M be such that |B| > |A| and |C| < |A|. Notice that
pi1(A, A) =
q(A)
2
(29)
pi1(B, A) = q(B)
(
UBAB +
SAB
2
)
(30)
pi1(C, A) = q(A)
(
UCAC +
SAC
2
)
+ q(C)− q(A) (31)
In order for A to be a symmetric equilibrium strategy it must be that the right hand side of
(29) is weakly greater than those in (30) and (31). Solving for q(B) and q(C), respectively, and
rearranging establishes (27) and (28). 
Proof of Proposition 5.
For the existence part of the proof, see Lemma 3. For the uniqueness part, assume by con-
tradiction that (A, A) and (C, C) are both equilibria, and, without loss of generality, |A| > |C|.
Suppose first that q(A) = q(C) = qˆ. Therefore, q(D) = qˆ for any D ∈ M such that
|C| ≤ |D| ≤ |A|. Let x˜ ∈ X \ C. Such a product x˜ necessarily exists, as |A| > |C| by assump-
tion. Notice that pi(C, C) = qˆ2 and pi(C ∪ {x˜}, C) = q(C ∪ {x˜})
(
pX (x˜)
SCC+pX (x˜)
+ 12
SCC
SCC+pX (x˜)
)
=
qˆ
(
2pX (x˜)+SCC
2(SCC+pX (x˜))
)
. Notice that as long as pX(x˜) > 0, which holds by assumption, the latter
is strictly greater than the former. Therefore, each firm offering C has an incentive to in-
crease the size of its menu by including a product in X \C, a contradiction. Next, assume that
q(A) < q(C). Since (A, A) is an equilibrium, then, by condition (28), q(C) ≤ q(A)3−2UCAC−SAC2 .
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Moreover, since q(C) > q(A), then it must be that 2UCAC + SAC < 1. Similarly, since (C, C)
is an equilibrium as well, then, by condition (27), q(C) ≥ q(A)(2UAAC + SAC). By putting
these two together, 3 ≥ 4UAAC + 3SAC + 2UAAC. Since, by definition, UAAC + SAC + UCAC = 1,
then 3 ≥ 2 + 2UAAC + SAC. This inequality is always false, as 2UCAC + SAC < 1 implies that
2UAAC + SAC > 1, a contradiction. 
Proof of Proposition 6:
Assume first that |A∗| = k, so that A∗ = X. We now investigate the conditions under
which X is a symmetric-equilibrium strategy. Given that X is the largest menu, then profitable
deviations can consist of only simpler menus C. By applying condition (28) of Lemma 3,
which ensures that deviations to simpler menus are not profitable, we obtain
k + n + 1− |C|
k + n + 1− k ≤
3
2
− SXC
2
The right-hand side of this inequality is always greater than 1, because SXC2 is strictly
smaller than 12 . On the other hand, as n → ∞, then the left-hand side converges towards
1. This implies that as the menu size threshold of the least overloaded consumer grows to
infinity, then X is a symmetric equilibrium strategy.
However, if n is sufficiently small, but large enough to ensure that X is the welfare-maximising
menu, then X is not necessarily a symmetric equilibrium strategy as the example in the main
body of the paper illustrates.
Assume now that |A∗| =
[
k+n+1
2
]
. Firstly, we show that deviating to more complex menus
B is not profitable. By applying condition 27 of Lemma (3), which ensures that deviations to
more complex menus are not profitable, we obtain
(k + n + 1− |B|)
([
k + n + 1
2
])−1
≤ 1
2UBAB + SAB
(32)
Notice that in the most unfavourable case preferences are uniformly distributed. The rea-
son is that, by proposition 5, A∗ must contain the |A∗| most preferred products. Therefore,
any product in A∗ must have a choice probability at least as high as any product outside
X \ A∗ implying that in the most unfavourable case the products outside A have the same
choice probabilities of the products in A. Hence, we assume that preferences are uniform.
By Lemma (3), expected profits to deviations to more complex menus B are maximised when
the size of the intersection |A∗ ∩ B| is maximised. Hence, the right-hand side of the above
inequality reduces to 1
2 |B|−|A
∗|
|B| +
|A∗|
|B|
= |B|
2|B|−[ k+n+12 ]
. In the supplementary material (available
from the authors upon request) we show that the resulting inequality is always true.
Secondly, we prove that deviating to simpler menus C is always profitable. By applying
condition 28 of Lemma (3), we obtain
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(k + n + 1− |C|)
([
k + n + 1
2
])−1
≤ 3− SAC − 2U
C
AC
2
(33)
If
[
k+n+1
2
]
= 1, then the statement is vacuously true. Since deviating to more complex
menus is never profitable, then, whenever
[
k+n+1
2
]
= 1, offering a menu of size 1 is an equi-
librium strategy. Next, assume that
[
k+n+1
2
]
≥ 2. Let |C| = 1. Then, the left-hand side
reduces to 1×
(
k+n+1−([ k+n+12 ])
k+n
)−1
. In the most favourable case the right-hand side is equal
to 32 − e for some arbitrarily small e > 0. In the supplementary material we show that the
resulting inequality is false. 
Proof of Proposition 7.
Assume first that |A∗| = 1. Then, profitable deviations can be only be to more complex
menus B. By applying condition (27) of Lemma (3),
p|B|−1 ≤ 1
2UBAB + SAB
(34)
In the most unfavourable case, the left-hand side is equal to p = e−2/3 ' 0.513417 (i.e.,
e−2/3 solves 1.5 = − 1ln(p) and is the highest value of p that makes the welfare-maximising
menu size equal to 1 by taking the rounding rule into account) and, by the arguments in
the proof of proposition (6), preferences are uniformly distributed. Therefore, the right-hand
side reduces to |B|2|B|−1 . We show in the supplementary material that the resulting inequality
is always true. Hence, whenever the welfare-maximizing menu size is 1 offering a singleton
menu is an equilibrium strategy.
Next, assume that |A∗| =
[
− 1ln(p)
]
. By taking the inverse, the welfare-maximising proba-
bility parameter p is equal to e−
1
|A∗| . We first show that deviating to simpler menus C consti-
tutes a profitable deviations. By applying condition 28 of Lemma (3)
(
e−
1
|A∗|
)|C|−|A∗|
≤ 3− 2U
C
AC − SAC
2
(35)
In the most favourable case the right-hand side of equation (35) is equal to 3/2. We show
in the supplementary material that if |C| = 1, then the above inequality is false for any value
of |A∗|. Hence, deviating to a sub-menu is always profitable.
Next, consider deviations to more complex menus B. We now prove that deviating to B
is never profitable. As discussed previously, in the most unfavourable case preferences are
uniformly distributed. Then, by applying condition (27) of Lemma (3),
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(
e−
1
|A∗|
)|B|−|A∗|
≤ |B|
2|B| − |A∗| (36)
We show in the supplementary material (available upon request) that the above in inequal-
ity is always true.
Finally, consider the case where |A∗| = k. In the supplementary material we show that
when the parameter p is sufficiently small, then offering a maximum-variety menu is an equi-
librium strategy. Moreover, in the main body of the paper we provide an example showing
that when p is large, whether offering a menu with k alternatives is an equilibrium strategy
depends upon consumers’ preferences. 
Finally, as referred to in footnote 15, we conclude with an example showing that if overload
is geometrically distributed and p is large enough, then whether offering a maximum-variety
menu is an equilibrium or not depends on consumers’ preferences. Indeed, assume that
X = {x1, x2, x3}. Assume also that p = 0.98. Notice that 0.98 > 1e1/3 ' 0.72. Therefore,
a menu of size 3 maximises welfare. Assume next that choice probabilities are pX(x1) =
pX(x2) = pX(x3) = 1/3. Then, condition 28 of Lemma 3 reduces to 1.04 ' 0.981−3 ≤ 3−
1
3
2 '
1.33 when |C| = 1 and 1.02 ' 0.982−3 ≤ 3− 232 ' 1.17 when |C| = 2. In both cases the
inequality is true. Therefore, X is a symmetric equilibrium strategy. Now assume, instead,
that choice probabilities are pX(x1) = 0.99, pX(x2) = pX(x3) = 0.005. Then, condition (28) of
Lemma 3 reduces to 1.02 ' 0.982−3 ≤ 3−(0.99+0.005)2 ' 1.0025 when |C| = 2, which leads to a
contradiction. Hence, in this second case X is not a symmetric equilibrium strategy.
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C Current Market Examples of Firms Competing in “Small” Menus
C.1 Subscription TV Contracts
Source: www.sky.com/shop/sky-bundles (accessed on 13th June 2017)
Source: www.virginmedia.com/shop/tv/tv-only.html (accessed on 28th June 2017; snapshot compilation)
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C.2 Broadband Contracts
Source: www.productsandservices.bt.com/products/broadband-packages (accessed on 30th June 2017)
Source: www.sky.com/shop/broadband-talk (accessed on 30th June 2017)
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C.3 Current Accounts
Source: https://www.lloydsbank.com/current-accounts.asp (accessed on 16th June 2017)
Source: http://personal.rbs.co.uk/personal/current-accounts/compare-current-accounts.html (accessed on 30th June 2017)
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C.4 Laptop Computers
Source: https://www.apple.com/uk/shop/buy-mac/macbook-pro/15-inch (accessed on 28th June 2017; snapshot compilation)
Source: http://www.dell.com/uk/p/xps-15-9560-laptop/pd (accessed on 30th June 2017)
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